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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

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Date: 3 Oct 1954 *ort*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Inspector General

SUBJECT : Manpower Survey of the (Clandestine Services
(Western Europe Division)

- REFERENCES :
- a. Manpower Survey of the Far Eastern Division, 18 August 1954. (Report #1)
 - b. Manpower Survey of the Eastern Europe Division, 22 September 1954. (Report #2)

I. AUTHORITY FOR THE SURVEY

A. In accordance with instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence, a task force has conducted a survey of the current practices employed within the Western Europe Division (DE/P) for the assignment, control, and reporting of manpower and personnel within this component. This report has been reviewed by the Chief, Management Staff, the Chief, WE Division, the Chief of Administration/AM, and the Personnel Officer/PS, all of whom have accepted the facts contained herein.

B. The scope of this survey report includes an examination of headquarters records of all staff employees and staff agents, including staff project personnel, in both headquarters and field.

II. PURPOSES OF THE SURVEY

A. To determine the accuracy and effectiveness of the numerous controls currently affecting the processing of personnel matters;

B. To determine the accuracy and effectiveness with which the existing records system reflects the assignment of personnel;

C. To determine the number of persons paid at headquarters with unvouchered funds;

D. To analyze the effectiveness of existing personnel and organizational control systems under which the Division operates; and

E. To arrive at conclusions affecting personnel management on the basis of information supplied by records, searches, and interviews with selected Division personnel.

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III. SOURCES OF TASK FORCE DATA

A. The sources from which data were obtained include:

1. Western Europe Division records maintained by the Assistant Director for Personnel (AD/P);
2. Payroll records of the Office of the Comptroller;
3. WE Division records;
4. WE Branch records; and
5. Interviews with selected personnel in the WE Division.

IV. SURVEY FINDINGS

A. The findings indicate that the basic personnel problems inherent in the current Agency system are equally applicable to WE Division as to the other divisions previously reviewed and it is desired at the outset clearly to indicate that correction of some of the problems noted herein is beyond the scope of Divisional responsibility.

B. The task force has approached the analysis of manpower control with the Western Europe Division from three (3) aspects: manpower controls, personnel management, and records and reports. All data and reports examined were as of 31 July 1954 (unless otherwise noted).

C. Effectiveness of Manpower Controls

1. Manpower Ceiling:

a. The Division is within its total official civilian manpower ceiling as reported in the AD/P's Monthly Personnel Statistical Review (See Tab A). In terms of physical location, this total is divided between headquarters and the field as follows:

Headquarters: Ceiling

Located in Headquarters



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
UNDER CEILING (Headquarters) - - - - -



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
Field:	Coiling	
	Located in the Field	
	INDEX COILING (Field) - - - - -	
	TOTAL INDEX COILING (WE Division)	

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2. Table of Organization and Position Inventory, AD/P:

a. The table of organization when combined with the position inventory purports to be a record of positions authorized the division, and the incumbents of such positions. As such, it relates names to positions and components on the authorized table of organization and thereby becomes the official record of assignment and location for each employee. The task force found that this official record does not accurately reflect actual assignments and locations.

b. Further, the task force found that the AD/P position inventory for the Western Europe Division does not



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and SE Divisions, may be attributed to the fact that the AD/P records reflect the status of individuals only to the extent to which the same has been formalized by official personnel actions (Standard Form 52).

c. The inconsistencies encountered between actual duty status or location and the information reflected in AD/P records, are as follows:

(1) No physical location or interim duties shown

(a) Unassigned

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(b) Enlisted as FI of AD/P



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Total



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(2) Inaccurate description of location and/or duties

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(a) Persons carried on [redacted] T/O's but physically in headquarters pending reassignment and/or processing for courses

[redacted] 25X9A2

(b) Persons carried on one T/O but performing duty in another

[redacted] 25X9A2

Total

TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE
INCONSISTENCIES

d. An example of the inconsistencies resulting from the existing T/O system is found in the relationship between WE and IO Divisions. In 9 June 1954 the IO segment of the IT Staff was made an independently functioning division. However, to date, the T/O accompanying this change has not been approved by AD/P with regard to the classification and wage aspects. Since its establishment, IO Division has requested increases to the pending T/O. Pending approval of the original T/O and of the requested increases, WE Division has two (2) personnel on unvouchered funds and one (1) person on vouchered funds who are actually on duty in IO, though continuing to be paid from WE Division funds. Conversely, the task force found one individual paid from IT funds on duty in WE Division.

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3. [redacted]

a. The task force finds that (as of July 1954) confidential funds were used for the payment of [redacted] clandestine services personnel in headquarters under the jurisdiction of the Western Europe Division. (See Tab B). None of these personnel occupied authorized headquarters unvouchered positions.

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[redacted] 25X9A2

(1) Attached as Tab C are five (5) detailed case histories of personnel who are performing headquarters duties pending reassignment, yet are paid from unvouchered funds.

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b. These [redacted] individuals paid from unvouchered funds while on duty in headquarters may be categorized as follows:

(1) Out-casuals (those who had entered on duty on unvouchered funds without having since served overseas) and

(2) In-casuals (those who are overseas returnees).

c. By length of time in headquarters on unvouchered funds, there were (as of 31 July 1954):

	<u>In-casual</u>	<u>Out-casual</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Less than three (3) months	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Three (3) to six (6) months	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Six (6) months to one (1) year	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
One (1) year and over	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
TOTAL	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

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d. As listed by name in Tab B - of the [redacted] personnel in an in or out casual status one person is in a duty status virtually the same as officially assigned headquarters personnel; of the remaining two (2) are on DMO and [redacted] have specific assignment for either headquarters or overseas, in either case administrative processing requires such personnel to remain at headquarters on unvouchered funds, until [redacted] personnel actions can be completed. The continued use of unvouchered funds for such salary payments constitutes to a considerable degree a solution to an administrative difficulty which is believed in conflict with the intent of [redacted]

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e. It is evident that budgetary controls also suffer from the practice of accounting for and paying headquarters personnel from field allotment accounts. The budgetary distortion created by this practice appears to be substantial enough to warrant further attention.

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D. Personnel Records and Reports

1. Comparison of AD/P Strength Report and Task Force Findings:

The current personnel reporting system does not accurately reflect the actual WE Division headquarters strength. As of 31 July 1954 the task force found [redacted] additional civilian employees on duty in WE Division headquarters above that reported by the AD/P as of the same date.

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**ON DUTY STRENGTH
(WE Division Headquarters)**

Office of Personnel Report (31 July 1954)

Civilian Personnel [redacted]

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Task Force Findings (31 July 1954)

On authorized Edge slots (vouchered) [redacted]

Unassigned (vouchered)

Not on Position Inventory

On field slots but in Edge (unvouchered)

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TOTAL [redacted]

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DISCREPANCY [redacted]

2. WE Division Personnel Records Management

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The WE [redacted] maintains records similar to those found in the FE and SE Divisions. (See Tab D) It is worth noting that WE Division has elected not to use the OF-14 which the Office of Personnel forwards with each new employee and substitutes a card of their own design for maintenance of Division Position Inventory.

3. WE Branch Personnel Records Management

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The WE branches, with the exception of [redacted] do not maintain personnel records nor do they utilize a

Note: This figure does not include personnel on detail.

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significant amount of staff time on personnel matters. In [redacted], an Area Operations Officer (Career designation - PF), serves as an administrative assistant to the branch chief, maintaining files on both staff agents and staff employees (the latter to be discontinued according to Chief of Admin. Div) under the jurisdiction of the branch and devoting approximately eighty-five percent (85%) of his time to administrative matters.

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B. Personnel Management

1. The placement of personnel returning from overseas tours of duty is not as paramount a problem for NE Division as that confronting FE and SE Divisions. This is partially explained in that (a) NE Division with an authorized headquarters strength only slightly smaller than FE and SE Divisions has far fewer field positions than FE and SE Divisions, hence fewer returnees and (b) the overseas assignments in NE Division are generally regarded as desirable geographic locations and a high percentage of personnel are willing to accept original and consecutive overseas tours.

2. Unlike FE and SE Divisions, reassignments for NE Division personnel returning from overseas assignments were not precluded because of the lack of position vacancies within the division. As listed in Tab B, there were [redacted] returnees in NE Division as of 31 July 1954, who had not been officially transferred to their new assignments. The division had [redacted] headquarters [redacted] field table of organization position vacancies within its component ceiling of which headquarters slots are to be utilized for the placement of those returnees who, according to NE, will remain in headquarters.

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3. Of the [redacted] had returned less than three months previously, [redacted] were on extended IDOP, and the remaining [redacted] were working in assignments outside NE Division. The official transfer of these latter [redacted] persons was reported by NE Division to be delayed because of the lack of slots in the divisions to which the [redacted] individuals were to be transferred.

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4. Other factors which delay the official reassignment of overseas returnees are as follows:

a. Reluctance on the part of Branch Chiefs to firm up assignments until the individual returns from overseas and is interviewed.

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- b. Reluctance on the part of the employee to accept an assignment prior to his return from overseas in order that he will have the opportunity of investigating all possibilities for reassignment.

5. The task force found [redacted] individuals on headquarters T/O positions and [redacted] individuals on field T/O positions two or more normal promotion steps under the authorized T/O grade (See Tab E). This is not necessarily an undesirable or significant factor as long as the individuals concerned are the most senior and qualified for the position. However, the number of such cases does raise the question as to whether or not the Division has thoroughly screened all of its qualified and available personnel prior to making a specific assignment. It also is an indication that the Career Service Boards may not be effecting a review of personnel in other divisions and Agency offices who might be more deserving and qualified to fill the higher graded positions.

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V. BRIEF CONCLUSIONS

A. The task force review of the Western Europe Division reveals some of the same weaknesses encountered in and reported on the Far Eastern and Eastern Europe Divisions (References a. and b.) It was found that:

1. Agency controls over actual assignments are not fully effective;

2. The personnel reporting and assignment systems currently employed do not reflect accurately to senior Agency officials the actual assignments, strengths, and locations of clandestine Services staff employee and staff agents;

3. In the field of personnel management, the overseas returnee problem continues to be of importance. To date, there is no fully effective mechanism to ensure systematic placement or selection out of returning personnel; and

4. Because of the current administrative mechanism, the Division is required to utilize unvouchered funds for the payment of returning personnel. Such payment, unless specifically authorized for security reasons, is believed in conflict with the intent of CIA [redacted] which precludes the use of unvouchered funds for the solution of administrative problems.

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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Pending the development of more adequate control and reporting

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systems, it is recommended that:

1. All clandestine services personnel on duty in headquarters under WE Division jurisdiction and not occupying authorized headquarters positions be transferred to, and reported in, a formalized in-casual or out-casual group as appropriate; and that, furthermore, all such personnel in casual status be paid with vouchered funds except those out-casuals whose departure within sixty (60) days has been formalized and/or where a specific and approved security or operational aspect exists.

2. After implementation of A.L. above, Western Europe Division process personnel actions within thirty (30) days correcting all personnel records which do not indicate correct assignments or correct physical locations.

3. Western Europe Division be further directed to:

a. Report in detail to the Chief of Operations (SO/P), with copies to the Inspector General and the Inspection and Review Staff (IS/P), every thirty (30) days, all actions which have been taken and those which remain to be taken in order to comply with the recommendations made above, and that these periodic reports be submitted until the recommendations above have been fully implemented;

b. Ensure, on all future WE personnel reports to senior Clandestine Services officials, that the following factors are reported:

(1) All personnel in in-casual or out-casual status.

(2) All personnel not on currently authorized table of organization position slots.

(3) All personnel in headquarters paid from unvouchered funds and not on authorized headquarters table of organization slots.

(4) All personnel performing duty other than that of the table of organization position to which they have been assigned.

(5) All personnel on duty in WE Division but not filling table of organization positions in the Division (e.g., JOT, consultants, details from outside WE, etc.)

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D. Recommendations affecting over-all Clandestine Services personnel procedures which appear to be indicated by certain findings in this survey and those of FA and SE Divisions will be covered in separate reports.

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Chief, Inspection and Review

Attachments: Tabs A through E-

Distribution:

Original and 1: Addressee
2: Inspector General
1: AIV
1: IN/A, IN/C (Admin)
1: Chief, Management Staff
1: Chief, IS
1: ISB Task Force
1: ISB Subject File
1: ISB Chrono

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